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THE IMPLAUSIBILITY STANDARD FOR
ENVIRONMENTAL PLAINTIFFS: THE TWIQBAL
PLAUSIBILITY PLEADING STANDARD AND
AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES
Celeste Anquonette Ajayi*
Abstract: Environmental plaintiffs often face challenges when pleading their claims. This
is due to difficulty in obtaining the particular facts needed to establish causation, and thus
liability. In turn, this difficulty inhibits their ability to vindicate their rights. Prior to the shift
in pleading standards created by Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly and Ashcroft v. Iqbal, often
informally referred to as “Twiqbal,” plaintiffs could assert their claims through the simplified
notice pleading standard articulated in Conley v. Gibson. This allowed plaintiffs to gain access
to discovery, which aided in proving their claims.
The current heightened pleading standard established by Twiqbal, also referred to as the
plausibility pleading standard, serves as a gatekeeping mechanism that keeps environmental
plaintiffs out of courts and away from justice by dismissing meritorious claims. Meanwhile,
courts have repeatedly refused to apply the heightened pleading standard to defendants’
pleadings, namely affirmative defenses, resulting in a split across the circuit courts. This
practice aids defendants at the expense of plaintiffs by allowing defendants to adhere to a less
stringent standard, putting plaintiffs on unequal footing. The standard allows defendants to
make conclusory assertions, which may effectively defeat a plaintiff’s case. Further, this
practice increases the possibility of judicial bias because various courts across the United States
apply different standards to both parties. If courts instead uniformly applied the heightened
pleading standard to both plaintiffs and defendants alike and allowed environmental plaintiffs
relaxed specificity requirements due to their limited access to information at the pleading stage,
it could address some of the inequalities created as a result of Twiqbal.
This Comment examines the impact of the heightened pleading standard on environmental
plaintiffs and proposes the circuit split be reconciled. Part I discusses the massive shift to the
heightened pleading standard from Conley to Twombly and Iqbal. Part II explains three main
critiques of the Twiqbal plausibility pleading standard. Part III discusses the unique attributes
of environmental litigation that are in conflict with the heightened pleading standard. Part IV
explains the conflict between the heightened pleading standard and environmental litigation
through a case study of the different ways in which courts have inconsistently applied the
heightened pleading standard to plaintiffs’ claims and defendants’ affirmative defenses.
Finally, Part V argues that courts should apply the Twiqbal standard in a consistent manner to
both plaintiffs and defendants, as well as provide flexibility to environmental plaintiffs’
pleadings to ensure plaintiffs have adequate access to the requisite information needed to
sufficiently plead their cases and receive justice.

* J.D. Candidate, University of Washington School of Law, Class of 2022. I want to thank Professor
Jeff Feldman for his guidance and perspective in the development of this Comment. I also want to
thank my colleagues in Washington Law Review Notes & Comments Department for their dedication
to and input into this Comment, particularly Kayla Ganir, Caroline Sung, and Zander Hoke.
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INTRODUCTION
Prior to Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly1 and Ashcroft v. Iqbal,2 the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (FRCP) allowed plaintiffs to assert their
claims through simplified notice pleading and prove their claims through
facts obtained during the discovery process.3 Now, the plausibility
pleading standard established in Twombly and Iqbal undermines this
process and places additional burdens on plaintiffs seeking to bring
environmental claims.4 If a toxic tort or contamination claim is an
aggrieved party’s only cause of action, justified plaintiffs may not be able
to vindicate their rights in the court system at all.5
Environmental law is a unique area of law that often requires a basic
understanding of the underlying science to recognize when there is an
environmental harm.6 Since the shift to the plausibility pleading standard,
environmental practitioners find asserting claims burdensome due to
difficulty in obtaining the necessary facts to establish that the defendant
caused their harm.7 These necessary facts tend to be extremely
particularized but often unobtainable without discovery.8 As a result,
1. 550 U.S. 544 (2007).
2. 556 U.S. 662 (2009).
3. See Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45, 47 (1957).
4. Kevin T. Haroff, Open or Shut—Pleading Federal Environmental Claims After Twombly and
Iqbal, 13 NO. 2 ABA ENV’L. LITIG. & TOXIC TORTS COMM. NEWSL. (Am. Bar Ass’n, New York,
N.Y.), July 2012, at 3.
5. Note, Causation in Environmental Law: Lessons from Toxic Torts, 128 HARV. L. REV. 2256,
2261–62 (2015).
6. See Jeff Surtees, What Is Environmental Law and Why Is it Hard to Understand?, LAWNOW
(Jan. 4, 2017), https://www.lawnow.org/environmental-law-hard-understand [https://perma.cc/S9R9FNL3]; Eric Biber, Environmental Law in Canada, LEGAL PLANET (Apr. 30, 2012), https://legalplanet.org/2012/04/30/environmental-law-in-canada/ [https://perma.cc/2BTH-N5ZS]. Both the
United States and Canada have similar environmental laws, including the United States’ National
Environmental Policy Act and Canada’s federal environmental review statute, thus a need for a basic
understanding of the science underlying harm is relevant in both countries. Further, Canada’s
environmental laws are much less strict than the United States’ laws.
7. See Scott Foster, Breaking the Transsubstantive Pleading Mold: Public Interest Environmental
Litigation After Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 35 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV. 885, 903–04 (2011);
Causation in Environmental Law, supra note 5, at 2261.
8. Foster, supra note 7, at 902. Foster discusses two cases—Goliad Cnty. v. Uranium Energy Corp.,
No. V-08-18, 2009 WL 1586688 (S.D. Tex. June 5, 2009), and Env’t World Watch, Inc. v. Walt
Disney Co., No. CV 09-04045 DDP, 2009 WL 3365915 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 19, 2009)—where the
importance of discovery was shown in environmental litigation. Id. In Goliad County, the court found
that the plaintiff lacked sufficient factual allegations under Iqbal because they could not show
intention of the defendant to contaminate water. Id. In Environmental World Watch, the court found
that the plaintiffs’ factual allegations were sufficient even though they were unable to show the
toxicity level of Disney’s Cr(VI) discharge. Id. Cr(VI) is “one of the valence states . . . of the element
chromium,” which is often used in industrial processes and “known to cause cancer.” Hexavalent
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pleading has become a gatekeeping mechanism that keeps environmental
plaintiffs out of courts and away from justice.9 This is particularly evident
in toxic tort and environmental contamination cases due to the slowrevealing nature of environmental harm.10 Meanwhile, defendants may
simply assert a FRCP 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss to efficiently end a claim
against them or assert affirmative defenses in a conclusory manner.
Various criticisms of the Twombly and Iqbal rulings have come to light
as a result of the cases’ establishment of the plausibility pleading standard.
Three main criticisms are that the standard results in plaintiffs’ inability
to receive and access justice;11 unfair burdens on plaintiffs;12 and judicial
bias leading to nonuniformity.13 These injustices must be addressed to
ameliorate the harm that Twiqbal has caused.
Part I of this Comment discusses the shift in pleading standards from
notice pleading set out in Conley v. Gibson14 to heightened pleading
established by both Twombly and Iqbal and the circuit split that has
occurred as a result. Part II explains three main critiques the Twiqbal
plausibility pleading standard has generated. Part III discusses the unique
Chromium,
U.S.
DEP’T
OF
LABOR,
https://www.osha.gov/hexavalent-chromium
[https://perma.cc/9DVA-QJJU]. Both cases involved a missing fact, but the courts reached two
different conclusions. Foster, supra note 7, at 902. Goliad County “represents an entire class of cases
where potentially meritorious claims cannot move into discovery on the basis of pleading a fact that
has not, but might, come to light.” Id. This shows not only the need for discovery, but also how the
heightened pleading standard has disparate impacts. Id.
9. Kevin M. Clermont & Stephen C. Yeazell, Inventing Tests, Destabilizing Systems, 95 IOWA L.
REV. 821, 823 (2010).
10. See Causation in Environmental Law, supra note 5, at 2261–62; Foster, supra note 7, at 903–
04.
11. See, e.g., Stephen B. Burbank & Stephen N. Subrin, Litigation and Democracy: Restoring a
Realistic Prospect of Trial, 46 HARV. C.R.–C.L. L. REV. 399, 405 (2011) (stating that Twiqbal
“undercut[] the effectiveness of congressional statutes” that were intended to “compensate citizens
for injury” and gave trial judges “enormous discretionary power to dismiss complaints,” even if the
cases would have been meritorious).
12. See, e.g., Leslie A. Gordon, For Federal Plaintiffs, Twombly and Iqbal Still Present a Catch22,
ABA
J.:
THE
NAT’L
PULSE
(Jan.
1,
2011,
8:50
AM),
https://www.abajournal.com/magazine/article/for_federal_plaintiffs_twombly_and_iqbal_still_prese
nt_a_catch-22 [https://perma.cc/G4U3-A4M7] (stating that Twiqbal created an unfair burden on
plaintiffs without the tool of pre-trial discovery because if detailed facts are needed from the
beginning, plaintiffs “may have to foot the bill to investigate on their own,” which creates a burden
at best, “just to have [their] case heard on the merits” or at worst, that is a “complete barrier to the
courthouse”).
13. See, e.g., Suzette M. Malveaux, Front Loading and Heavy Lifting: How Pre-Dismissal
Discovery Can Address the Detrimental Effect of Iqbal on Civil Rights Cases, 14 LEWIS & CLARK L.
REV. 65, 82 (2010) (stating that Twiqbal put an “emphasis on the conclusory nature of an allegation,”
which now requires judges to make a distinction between conclusory and non-conclusory allegations.
This emphasis creates a uniformity issue among courts because there has not been a “principled and
uniform way” in which judges can make this distinction.).
14. 355 U.S. 41 (1957).
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attributes of environmental litigation that are in conflict with the
heightened pleading standard. Part IV explains the conflict between the
heightened pleading standard and environmental litigation through a case
study of the different ways in which courts have inconsistently applied the
heightened pleading standard to plaintiffs’ claims and defendants’
affirmative defenses. Finally, Part V argues that courts should apply the
Twiqbal standard in a consistent manner to both plaintiffs and defendants
and provide flexibility to environmental plaintiffs’ pleadings to not only
resolve the circuit split, but ensure plaintiffs have adequate access to the
requisite information needed to sufficiently plead their cases.
I.

THE MASSIVE SHIFT IN PLEADING STANDARDS

Pleading is a necessary step to initiate a civil suit that has evolved over
time from the notice pleading established in Conley v. Gibson to the more
stringent plausibility pleading standard created by Bell Atlantic Corp. v.
Twombly and Ashcroft v. Iqbal. Generally, the person bringing suit, the
plaintiff, must file a complaint that lays out their version of facts and the
cause of action, “highlighting the factual and legal basis of the suit.”15 The
defendant then files an answer. This includes an explanation as to why the
plaintiff should not prevail and may also include additional facts or an
excuse for the defendant’s actions.16 The defendant may also file a
counterclaim, arising from the same facts, asserting that the plaintiff has
caused them harm.17 Either the defendant or the plaintiff may have to file
a reply answering new allegations in the pleadings.18
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (FRCP) govern the general rules
of pleading for all parties to civil litigation. Under FRCP 8(a), a plaintiff’s
claim for relief must contain:
(1) a short and plain statement of the grounds for the court’s
jurisdiction, unless the court already has jurisdiction and the claim
needs no new jurisdictional support; (2) a short and plain
statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to
relief; and (3) a demand for the relief sought, which may include
relief in the alternative or different types of relief.19
Under FRCP 8(b)(1), a defendant responding to a pleading must:

15. How Courts Work: Steps in a Trial: Pleadings, A.B.A. (Sept. 9, 2019),
https://www.americanbar.org/groups/public_education/resources/law_related_education_network/h
ow_courts_work/pleadings (last visited Aug. 4, 2021) [hereinafter How Courts Work].
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a).
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“(A) state in short and plain terms its defenses to each claim asserted
against it; and (B) admit or deny the allegations asserted against it by an
opposing party.”20 Under FRCP 8(c), when responding to a pleading, a
party must “affirmatively state any avoidance or affirmative defense.”21
There are two distinct types of defenses in civil litigation: factual
defenses to a plaintiff’s claim and affirmative defenses. A factual defense
is an “attack on a plaintiff’s prima facie case” and directly contradicts
elements of the claim.22 These defenses “negate an element of the
plaintiff’s claim” or state that the plaintiff cannot meet its burden of
proof.23 By contrast, affirmative defenses assert that, even if the factual
allegations asserted in the complaint are true,24 the defendant should avoid
liability “based on additional allegations of excuse, justification or other
negating matters.”25
When reviewing the plaintiff’s complaint, the court will ignore
conclusions of law and assume well-pleaded facts to be true.26 These wellpleaded facts are not mere “recitals of the elements of a cause of action,”
but are based upon factual information.27 Then, the court will determine
whether the claim is plausible. The claim is plausible when the factual
content of the plaintiff’s complaint “allows the court to draw the
reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct
alleged.”28 To meet the plausibility standard, the plaintiff must show it is
more likely than not that the defendant is liable based on well-pleaded
facts.29 Although drawing inferences may be necessary, the defendant’s

20. Id. at 8(b)(1).
21. Id. at 8(c)(1). These affirmative defenses include, but are not limited to, assumption of risk,
contributory negligence, duress, estoppel, failure of consideration, fraud, illegality, laches, res
judicata, statute of frauds, statute of limitations, and waiver. Id.
22. Julianne M. Hartzell, United States: ‘The Forgotten Pleading’ Serves as Guide to Determining
Best Defense, MONDAQ (Aug. 1, 2018), https://www.mondaq.com/unitedstates/trials-appealscompensation/724132/the-forgotten-pleading39-serves-as-guide-to-determining-best-defense
[https://perma.cc/K4W7-ESD9].
23. Id.
24. Affirmative
Defense,
LEGAL
INFO.
INST.,
https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/affirmative_defense (last visited Aug. 18, 2021).
25. Hartzell, supra note 22; see also How Courts Work, supra note 15 (explaining that in a
defendant’s answer to the plaintiff’s complaint, the defendant may “offer additional facts” or “plead
an excuse”); Sloan Valve Co. v. Zurn Indus., Inc., 712 F. Supp. 2d 743, 749 (N.D. Ill. 2010).
26. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 679 (2009).
27. C. Kevin Marshall, Pleading Facts and Arguing Plausibility: Federal Pleading Standards a
Year After Iqbal, JONES DAY (June 2020), https://www.jonesday.com/en/insights/2010/06/pleadingfacts-and-arguing-plausibility-federal-pleading-standards-a-year-after-iiqbali
[https://perma.cc/QK46-5MD4] (quoting Ashcroft, 556 U.S. at 678).
28. Ashcroft, 556 U.S. at 678.
29. Id.
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liability for misconduct must be more than a possibility, meaning the
plaintiff must nudge the claim across the line from possible to plausible.30
Plausibility has not been adequately defined by the courts, but Twiqbal
established that allegations are not entitled to be deemed true solely
because they are bare assertions, conclusory, or a formulaic recitation of
the elements of a claim.31 This plausibility pleading standard established
in Twiqbal shifted massively from the notice pleading standard set out in
Conley.
A.

The Conley v. Gibson Notice Pleading Standard

Pleading requirements shifted completely from the Conley v. Gibson
notice pleading standard, which stood for fifty years, as a result of the Bell
Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly and Ashcroft v. Iqbal cases. The term “notice
pleading” was first introduced in Conley by the United States Supreme
Court.32
In Conley, African American railway employees alleged in their
complaint that an exclusive bargaining agreement between the Railway
and the Union under the Railway Labor Act (RLA) gave employees in the
bargaining unit certain protections from discharge and loss of seniority.33
The railroad claimed the union completely abolished forty-five jobs that
were held by African American employees.34 However, the plaintiffs
alleged that the Railroad actually filled these forty-five positions with
white employees as the African Americans were “ousted.”35 Conley held
that the FRCP do not require a claimant to set out in detail the facts upon
which they base their claim and that a complaint should be dismissed only
when it appears “beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts”
that support their allegations.36 Under Conley, the plaintiffs only needed
to notify the defendants of the issues raised. Therefore, the Supreme Court
held that the African American railway employees’ complaint was
sufficient in alleging a breach of the union’s statutory duty under the RLA
to represent all employees within the union fairly and without hostile
discrimination.37 If these allegations were proven, then there was a

30. Id.
31. Brandon L. Garrett, Applause for the Plausible, 162 U. PA. L. REV. 221, 221 (2014).
32. Robin J. Effron, Putting the “Notice” Back into Pleading, 41 CARDOZO L. REV. 981, 996
(2020).
33. Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 43 (1957).
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. Id. at 45.
37. Id. at 48.
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“manifest breach of the Union’s statutory duty,” giving the petitioners a
claim upon which relief could be granted.38 Thus, there was sufficient
evidence of a manifest breach because the complaint stated that they were
wrongfully discharged and that the Union refused to protect them.39 With
liberal opportunity for discovery and other pretrial procedures established
by the FRCP, this simplified “notice pleading” was long believed to be
sufficient.40 This standard stood for decades until Bell Atlantic Corp. v.
Twombly was decided.
B.

The Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly and Ashcroft v. Iqbal Shift to
the Plausibility Pleading Standard

The notice pleading standard stood for decades until Bell Atlantic Corp.
v. Twombly was decided. In 2007, Twombly, a subscriber of local
telephone services, alleged that Bell Atlantic and other local telephone
companies conspired to restrain trade by inflating charges for local
telephone and high-speed Internet services.41 He further alleged that the
companies engaged in parallel conduct in their service areas to inhibit
growth of new companies.42 The Supreme Court held the complaint did
not include facts to suggest that refraining from competition was in
conflict with the companies’ economic interests or that the actions taken
were because of a conspiracy.43 This holding was due to the complaint’s
conclusory statements and lack of particular facts.44 After the Twombly
ruling, plaintiffs now needed to plead in their complaint “something
more . . . than . . . a statement of facts that merely creates a suspicion [of]
a legally cognizable right of action.”45 This was a huge shift from the
simple notice pleading suggested in Conley to a much more stringent and
demanding standard that gives judges enhanced discretion.46 The
Twombly Court stated that courts must assess the pleadings’ sufficiency
and determine if the claim crosses the line from “conceivable to
plausible.”47 The Court’s basis for inserting this plausibility requirement
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.

Id. at 46.
Id.
Id. at 47.
Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 550 (2007).
Id.
Id. at 564–70.
Id.
Id. at 555 (quoting 5 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND
PROCEDURE § 1216 (3d ed. 2004)).
46. See Arthur R. Miller, From Conley to Twombly to Iqbal: A Double Play on the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure, 60 DUKE L.J. 1, 22 (2010).
47. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570.
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stemmed from the word “showing” in FRCP 8(a).48 The Court believed a
plaintiff must lay out detailed facts of a defendant’s behavior that directly
shows a plaintiff’s entitlement to relief, rather than merely any set of facts
that leave “open the possibility that a plaintiff might later establish some
‘set of [undisclosed] facts’ to support recovery.”49 This standard was
further defined by Ashcroft v. Iqbal.
In 2009, Javaid Iqbal, a Muslim Pakistani pretrial detainee, filed suit
against past and present government officials claiming that their actions
against him were unconstitutional with regard to the harsh conditions of
his confinement.50 Iqbal’s complaint stated that former Attorney General
John Ashcroft and Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI)
Robert Mueller designated him a “person of high interest” based on his
race, religion, or national origin in violation of the First and Fifth
Amendments.51 Iqbal asserted that Mueller directed the FBI to detain Arab
Muslim men during its September 11 investigation and that Ashcroft was
the “principal architect” of the agency’s discriminatory policy.52 Iqbal
argued that Ashcroft and Mueller “knew of, condoned, and willfully and
maliciously agreed to subject” him to harsh conditions in confinement as
a policy matter.53 Here, the Supreme Court held that Iqbal’s complaint
was insufficient, because Iqbal’s various claims were conclusory, were
not entitled to be assumed true, and Ashcroft and Mueller’s approval of
the detention policy did not “plausibly” suggest that they purposefully
discriminated based on race, religion, or national origin.54
The Court in Iqbal extended the plausibility standard to all civil actions
and took the pleading requirements of Twombly further,55 stating that
“recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere
conclusory statements, do not suffice.”56 To meet the plausibility
standard, the plaintiff’s claim must contain factual content that “allows
the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for
the misconduct alleged,” rather than a mere possibility.57 Iqbal
implemented a two-step process: (1) “identify the unadorned matter and
discard it”; and (2) “take the remaining well-pleaded factual allegations,
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.

Id. at 555.
Id. at 561.
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 666 (2009).
Id. at 669.
Id.
Id. at 680.
Id. at 683.
Id. at 684.
Id. at 678.
Id. at 663.
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accept them as true, ‘and then determine whether they plausibly give rise
to an entitlement to relief.’”58 A court does not need to take facts as true
if they are deemed conclusory. If facts are deemed conclusory, a court
must ignore them.
C.

Twiqbal Split Across the Circuits

Despite the Supreme Court’s Twiqbal rulings, federal district courts are
divided on whether the heightened pleading standard applies to
affirmative defenses.59 This division means the standard is applied
differently depending on the court in which the case is filed. Therefore,
plaintiffs with similar harms receive “different treatment across
jurisdictions.”60 Further, the United States Circuit Courts continually
avoid the question of whether the Twiqbal standard applies to affirmative
defenses.61 As a result of this avoidance, the standard is applied differently
across the circuits. In Jones v. Bryant Park Market Events, L.L.C.,62 the
Second Circuit stated that it did not need to address the plausibility
question because “even if [it] were to apply the Iqbal-Twombly standard
to affirmative defenses,” it would not help the plaintiff.63 Likewise, in
Depositors Insurance Co. v. Estate of Ryan,64 the Sixth Circuit stated that
it was unnecessary for it to resolve the plausibility issue because the
district court did not apply the standard to the appellants’ affirmative
defenses.65 Additionally, in Herrera v. Churchill McGee, L.L.C.,66 the
Sixth Circuit further stated that it had “no occasion to address, and
express[ed] no view” regarding Twombly and Iqbal on affirmative
defenses.67 As a result, circuit and district courts have been inconsistent
in applying the Twombly and Iqbal standard to affirmative defenses.68

58. Matthew Schafer, Ten Years Later: Pleading Standards and Actual Malice, COMMC’NS. LAW.,
Winter 2020, at 1, 34 (quoting Ashcroft, 556 U.S. at 679).
59. See infra Part IV.
60. Deborah Beim, Intercircuit Splits, UNIV. OF MICH. COLL. OF LITERATURE, SCI., & THE ARTS,
https://sites.lsa.umich.edu/dbeim/research/intercircuit-splits/ [https://perma.cc/XKR5-HYLJ].
61. See infra notes 62–68.
62. 658 F. App’x 621 (2d Cir. 2016).
63. Id. at 624.
64. 637 F. App’x 864 (6th Cir. 2016).
65. Id. at 869.
66. 680 F.3d 539 (6th Cir. 2012).
67. Id. at 547 n.6.
68. See Jonathan M. Herman, Jaime Stilson & Kaleb McNeely, Plausibility in the Eye of the
Beholder: Circuits Address How to Read Twombly, 32 ANTITRUST 32, 35 (2017).
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ISSUES WITH THE TWIQBAL HEIGHTENED PLEADING
STANDARD

Since the Twombly and Iqbal rulings, various criticisms have come to
light as a result of the cases’ establishment of the plausibility pleading
standard. Three main criticisms of the pleading standard among scholars
include plaintiffs’ inability to receive and access justice, unfair burdens
on plaintiffs, and judicial bias leading to nonuniformity.69 Iqbal is
criticized for rewriting FRCP 8 to immunize executive officials at the
expense of plaintiffs.70 Further, the ruling portrays Twiqbal’s impact on
access to justice and fairness as a result of the highest court’s
susceptibility to bias.71
A.

Plaintiffs’ Inability to Receive and Access Justice

The Twiqbal shift created concern about the inability of plaintiffs to
access justice for their meritorious claims.72 Iqbal created a roadblock to
the courts for many types of plaintiffs by sustaining the belief that the
government may legally rely on “race, religion, or national origin in the
wartime context.”73 The commitment to allow plaintiffs full and equal
69. See supra notes 11–13.
70. Cara Shepley, Note, Ashcroft v. Iqbal: How the Supreme Court Rewrote Rule 8 to Immunize
High-Level Executive Officials from Post-9/11 Liability (A Plausible Interpretation), 69 MD. L. REV.
ENDNOTES 69, 101 (2010).
71. Shirin Sinnar, The Lost Story of Iqbal, 105 GEORGETOWN L.J. 379, 439 (2017). Sinnar criticizes
the court’s presentation of Javaid Iqbal without adequate consideration of the roles of race and religion
in detentions after September 11, calling the court “[o]blivious” to Iqbal as a person, “blind” to race
and religion with regard to post-September 11 detentions, and “indifferent” to the harm of the
practices it legitimized. Id. While the court majority believed that the detention decisions were based
on neither racial or religious criteria, or that use of such criteria was “rational and justified,” the
process of detainee identification and classification may have heavily relied on these factors
regardless of the lack of connections these individuals had to terrorism. Id. at 419–25. See also
Shepley, supra note 70, at 96–100 (discussing that while Justice Kennedy believed that Ashcroft’s
actions regarding the September 11 detention policy showed legitimate and necessary security
measures after a homeland attack, Justice Souter came to a nearly opposite conclusion). Shepley
argues that the contrast between Kennedy and Souter’s opinions show the inherent subjectivity given
to the judicial branch and criticizes the subjectivity displayed in Iqbal as shifting away from Marbury
v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803), which held that judicial review is saying what the law is
rather than what it should be. Id. at 114. The Supreme Court seems to have effectively decided what
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8 is rather than adhering to congressional intent of the FRCP. Id. at
117.
72. See Burbank & Subrin, supra note 11; Gordon, supra note 12; Myriam Gilles, Class Warfare:
The Disappearance of Low-Income Litigants from the Civil Docket, 65 EMORY L.J. 1531, 1568
(2016).
73. Dawinder S. Sidhu, First Korematsu and Now Ashcroft v. Iqbal: The Latest Chapter in the
Wartime Supreme Court’s Disregard for Claims of Discrimination, 58 BUFF. L. REV. 419, 505 (2010).
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access to the courts has been repudiated.74
Scholars and members of Congress worry that the heightened pleading
standard has and will continue to diminish plaintiffs’ ability to effectively
bring suit against their wrongdoers.75 While defendants have the ability to
bring FRCP 12(b)(6) motions to dismiss “without ever filing a pleading,”
plaintiffs “will be left out in the cold” because of the heightened burden
on pleadings.76 This is especially true in toxic tort and discrimination
cases, where discovery is essential to establish the facts.77 Without
discovery, obtaining the facts needed to comply with the heightened
pleading standard is extremely difficult.78
In environmental cases, the plaintiff now must plead a “factually
plausible case” without access to the “tools of discovery to uncover the
kind of evidence that would make their claim plausible.”79 Defendants
“inherently possess[] all the factual information,” especially in cases
regarding toxic chemicals and pesticides, because they have the ability to
conceal this evidence.80 In these cases, it is difficult to determine the cost
of remedial measures resulting from pollutants and trace the specific harm
with the specific chemical, source, and party responsible.81 This is because
harms may not appear until years after the exposure and the harmed
person “may have been exposed to a variety of potentially harmful
substances” caused by multiple actors.82 Consequently, tracing the harm
to the specific responsible actor to establish causation, which is required
to prove that the defendant actually caused the harm, may not be possible
Although the Supreme Court sustained this belief, the resulting procedural roadblocks for various
types of plaintiffs do not all directly relate to an individual’s race, religion, or national origin. See also
Malveaux, supra note 13, at 82; Gordon, supra note 12; Gilles, supra note 72, at 1568.
74. See Heather Buchanan, The Promise and Reality of Equal Access to Justice, INST. FOR THE
ADVANCEMENT OF THE AM. L. SYS. (Nov. 8, 2018), https://iaals.du.edu/blog/promise-and-realityequal-access-justice [https://perma.cc/X928-L2GT]; Arthur R. Miller, Widening the Lens: Refocusing
the Litigation Cost-and-Delay Narrative, 40 CARDOZO L. REV. 57, 72 (2018).
75. See Access to Justice Denied: Ashcroft v. Iqbal: Hearing Before the H. Subcomm. on the Const.,
C.R., & C.L., 111th Cong. 1 (2009) (statement of Rep. Jerrod Nadler, Chairman, Subcomm. on the
Const., C.R., and C.L.) [hereinafter Access to Justice Denied]; Malveaux, supra note 13.
76. Steve Subrin, Ashcroft v. Iqbal: Contempt for Rules, Statutes, the Constitution, and Elemental
Fairness, 12 NEV. L.J. 571, 580 (2012).
77. Id.
78. Zachry Sandifer, Insurmountable Burdens and Slippery Slopes: A Solution for Pleading Toxic
Torts in the Plausibility Era, 43 S. ILL. U. L.J. 435, 437 (2019).
79. WILLIAM FUNK, THOMAS OWEN MCGARITY, SIDNEY A. SHAPIRO & JAMES GOODWIN,
PLAUSIBILITY PLEADING: BARRING THE COURTHOUSE DOOR TO DESERVING CLAIMANTS 10 (2010).
80. Id.
81. See David T. Buente Jr., Thomas G. Echikson & James L. Connaughton, The “Civil”
Implications of Environmental Crimes, 23 ENV’T L. REP. 10589, 10597 (1993); Causation in
Environmental Law, supra note 5, at 2259.
82. Causation in Environmental Law, supra note 5, at 2259.
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in an environmental suit.83 One scholar has gone as far as calling the
Twiqbal standard “indefensible” if one “cares about enabling private
litigants” in their right to assert substantive law violations through the
court system.84 This scholar argues that the pleading requirements were
redefined in Iqbal to protect government defendants, as well as corporate
ones, at the expense of plaintiffs.85
Other scholars argue that the Twiqbal standard simply helps secure the
“just, speedy, and inexpensive” resolution of each action and proceeding
provided for in FRCP 1.86 They argue that the requirements inserted by
Twiqbal ensure plaintiffs are justified when “invoking the coercive power
of the state.”87 However, others describe the rulings as diminishing
democracy for plaintiffs.88 These scholars argue that the Court effectively
replaced the “system of notice pleading”89 and turned the dismissal
motion, which was initially intended to only handle “rare complaints that
lacked a valid legal theory,” into an efficient attack on complaints that are
seen as “counterintuitive” by judges without the benefit of discovery.90
Motions to dismiss under FRCP 12(b)(6) are given “life-or-death
significance,”91 as successful motions are “more than twice as likely”
under the plausibility pleading standard.92
B.

Unfair Burdens on Plaintiffs

Some scholars argue that the Twiqbal shift results in unfair burdens on
plaintiffs and, as a result, skews the scale of justice in favor of defendants.
One scholar asserts that if plaintiffs are expected to present “detailed facts
from the outset,” rather than acquiring these facts through the discovery
process, they may have to “foot the bill” to find the facts on their own.93
This scholar states that at best, this creates an unfair burden, and at worst,

83. Id.
84. A. Benjamin Spencer, Pleading and Access to Civil Justice: A Response to Twiqbal Apologists,
60 UCLA L. REV. 1710, 1735 (2013).
85. Id. at 1737.
86. Harvie Wilkinson III, The Presumption of Civil Innocence, 104 VA. L. REV. 589, 643 (2018);
see Fed. R. Civ. P. 1.
87. Wilkinson III, supra 86, at 643.
88. Burbank & Subrin, supra note 11, at 405–08.
89. Id. at 403.
90. Id. at 407.
91. Miller, supra note 74, at 72.
92. Patricia W. Hatamyar, The Tao of Pleading: Do Twombly and Iqbal Matter Empirically?, 59
AM. UNIV. L. REV. 553, 621 (2010).
93. Gordon, supra note 12.
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creates “a complete barrier to the courthouse.”94
This barrier may also inhibit low-income litigants from obtaining
adjudication. If the low-income population is no longer allowed access to
court, neither are its “contributions, voices, and perspectives.”95 Another
scholar calls this a “potentially high cost to both the affected groups and
society more broadly.”96 As a result, low-income groups are essentially
barred from accessing the civil justice system simply due to their income
level. This is unfair and antithetical to the notion of justice.97 Even if
plaintiffs are justified in bringing suit, they may face unreasonable
litigation expenses, which will slow their case and result in excessive, and
expensive, lawyer involvement.98 This relates to a low-income litigant’s
ability to receive justice, as only the elite have adequate access to the court
because Twiqbal effectively serves as a gatekeeping mechanism.99 For
plaintiffs, the more stringent plausibility pleading standard creates
“significantly higher and more resource-consumptive procedural
barriers.”100 This resulting impact on civil suits runs contrary to many of
the values underlying the FRCP, including fairness.101 Judicial decisions
applying the plausibility standard to plaintiffs ultimately aid defendants at
plaintiffs’ expense, which has been criticized as “contemptuous of history,
rules, statutes, the Constitution, and principles of fairness.”102 These are
rights that should be supported, but “cannot be without discovery.”103
Other scholars argue that holding defendants to the same pleading
standard as plaintiffs is unfair due to the “limited time and knowledge”

94. Id.
95. Gilles, supra note 72, at 1568.
96. Id.
97. See Sasha Nichols, Access to Cash, Access to Court: Unlocking the Courtroom Doors with
Third-Party Litigation Finance, 5 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 197, 198 (2016) (arguing that plaintiffs with
“potentially meritorious claims” cannot access the courthouse due to a “liquidity problem”: plaintiffs
who “lack the capital necessary to pursue a claim” cannot pay for the various fees involved in
litigation, including “court fees, lawyers’ fees, bond requirements, and expert witness fees,” leaving
them with little resources to right the wrongs against them); Ian Weinstein, Coordinating Access to
Justice for Low- and Moderate-Income People, 20 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 501, 504–05 (2017)
(explaining that the justice system is intended for all, but there is a gap between the wealthy, who
have “ready access to lawyers, courts, and alternative dispute resolution fora,” and low-income
households, who have lower access to lawyers or courts yet more legal problems than even those of
only “moderate means”).
98. Miller, supra note 74, at 78–79.
99. Clermont & Yeazell, supra note 9, at 823; see Nichols, supra note 97, at 198.
100. Miller, supra note 46, at 2.
101. Id.; Fed. R. Civ. P. 1.
102. Subrin, supra note 76, at 581.
103. Id.
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possessed by the parties during the pleading stage.104 While it is true that,
as a result of Twiqbal, more cases never reach discovery and dockets are
less cluttered,105 this approach favors efficiency over fairness. Before
Twiqbal, a plaintiff did not need to “set out in detail the facts upon which
[they] base [their] claim,” but only needed to give the defendant fair notice
of the claim.106 For example, an environmental plaintiff asserting a claim
that the defendant intentionally failed to disclose the extent of soil and
groundwater contamination before the plaintiff purchased the land likely
would not need to lay out specific facts depicting the harm and the
defendants’ state of mind in order to have sufficient pleadings. Under
Twiqbal, the plaintiff’s pleadings now must contain sufficient
particularity. This environmental plaintiff would likely need to plead more
specific facts that directly link the defendant’s actions to the particular
contaminant to avoid having their claim deemed conclusory by the court.
However, this would be more difficult because they may not have access
to the necessary facts without great expense.
C.

Judicial Bias Leading to Nonuniformity

Judicial bias exists while determining plausibility because it is a
subjective task. As a result, these decisions often lead to nonuniformity.107
Determining plausibility and whether a complaint is conclusory is
“[e]lusive and [p]roblematic.”108 It requires that judges use significant
discretion in distinguishing between conclusory and non-conclusory
allegations without a concrete framework that creates a conscientious and
uniform analysis.109
Iqbal is criticized as being a highly biased decision. According to one
scholar, the Justices in Iqbal offered “their own version of activism in
service of” their own general hostility to litigation and “challenges to
government authority in particular.”110 One views the Court as treating
“clearly factual allegations” as conclusory purely based on the fact that
the Court does not believe them without further supporting information.111
They attribute the Court’s skepticism in regard to certain factual
104. Nathan Pysno, Should Twombly and Iqbal Apply to Affirmative Defenses?, 64 VAND. L. REV.
1633, 1659 (2011).
105. Id. at 1666.
106. Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957).
107. See infra Part IV.
108. Malveaux, supra note 13, at 82.
109. Id.
110. A. Benjamin Spencer, Iqbal and the Slide Toward Restrictive Procedure, 14 LEWIS & CLARK
L. REV. 185, 201 (2010).
111. Id.
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allegations to the Justices’ own “worldview and perspective as societal
elites with various presumptions.”112 This suggests that evidence may be
appraised in a biased manner by judges. Another scholar argues that we
often can “construct our social world to avoid hearing certain types of
claims.”113 This scholar argues that when dismissal is abused, it “breaches
our duty to listen to our fellows and does not respect members of
marginalized communities as epistemic agents.”114 Reasonable people can
view the same objective facts differently based on their personal biases.
Each Justice’s worldview allows them to “create conditions” where they
feel justified in dismissing potentially meritorious claims.115
People, even Supreme Court Justices, may fall victim to their own
individual biases. The subjective and broad requirements of the Twiqbal
pleading standard may result in judicial decisions based upon a biased
review of factual assertions. While adjudicating claims requires a great
deal of discretion, inserting a broad standard may lead to more biased
opinions due to differences among judges’ personal perceptions paired
with the lack of a concrete framework in applying the standard. In United
States v. Halliburton Energy Services, Inc.,116 the United States District
Court for the Southern District of Texas held the plaintiffs’
Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability
Act (CERCLA)117 arranger claim met the Twiqbal pleading standard.118
The plaintiffs in that case asserted that the defendant sent radioactive
materials for repair, storage, and disposal.119 Under CERCLA, one who
arranges for the disposal or treatment of hazardous material is liable for
its subsequent release into the environment.120 In contrast, the Ninth
Circuit in Hinds Investments, L.P. v. Angioli121 held that the plaintiffs
asserting a CERCLA arranger claim did not meet the Twiqbal pleading
standard.122 In Hinds, the plaintiffs asserted that the defendants
contributed to the disposal of hazardous waste by distributing manuals
that instructed operators “to dispose of waste water down the drain and

112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.

Id.
David Schraub, Deliberation and Dismissal, 22 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1319, 1386 (2020).
Id.
Id.
No. H-07-3795, 2008 WL 656475 (S.D. Tex. Mar. 6, 2008).
42 U.S.C. §§ 9601–75.
Halliburton, 2008 WL 656475, at *1.
Id.
42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(2).
445 F. App’x 917 (9th Cir. 2011).
Id. at 919.
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into the sewer.”123 The court stated that the plaintiffs had not “alleged facts
showing [d]efendants sold dry cleaning equipment for the purpose of
disposing of perchloroethylene or that [d]efendants exercised control over
the disposal process”124 These two courts came to opposite conclusions
when presented with similar assertions. While it is not possible to
eliminate all bias in decision-making, becoming aware of personal bias
and holding oneself accountable is feasible.125
III. ENVIRONMENTAL LITIGATION
Environmental law is unique and complex in that the field is heavily
grounded in science and critical thinking. One generally needs a basic
understanding of the science to recognize there is a problem.126
Environmental law must be able to adapt to “developing ecological
threats, evolving societal attitudes, and changing world circumstances,”
but has failed to do so.127 This creates a higher burden for plaintiffs when
attempting to plead an environmental claim.
The current environmental laws are lengthy, detailed, and some set out
a process rather than substantive standards. It is difficult to understand
how to bring an environmental lawsuit, and to comprehend which statute
is relevant. Environmental laws, such as the National Environmental
Policy Act (NEPA),128 generally inform an individual of the steps required
to initiate a lawsuit, but do not pre-judge an outcome.129 This means that
the statutes do not automatically determine the outcome. Contrastingly,
the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA)130 sets out firm
definitions of the solid and hazardous waste it aims to regulate, as well as
specific requirements for the categories of those who qualify for

123. Id. at 920.
124. Id. at 919.
125. Lindsay Northon, Become Aware of Personal Bias, and You’ll Improve Ethical Practice,
SHRM
(July
12,
2016),
https://www.shrm.org/resourcesandtools/hr-topics/behavioralcompetencies/ethical-practice/pages/become-aware-of-personal-bias-and-improve-ethical-practice.aspx [https://perma.cc/6HXB-A9NX]; Sharon Youmans & Elizabeth Ozer, Strategies to Address
Unconscious Bias, UNIV. OF CAL., S.F. OFF. OF DIVERSITY & OUTREACH,
https://diversity.ucsf.edu/resources/strategies-address-unconscious-bias
[https://perma.cc/7DRPJ35H].
126. Surtees, supra note 6; Biber, supra note 6.
127. RICHARD J. LAZARUS, THE MAKING OF ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 225 (2004).
128. 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321–70.
129. Id. § 4321 (stating that NEPA established a “national policy” to generally “encourage
productive and enjoyable harmony between man and his environment” but does not dictate how a
case will result if a violation occurs).
130. 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901–92k.
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regulation.131 Each environmental law statute has its own individual
enforcement provisions, civil penalties, and criminal penalties.132 This
field is detailed, complex, and plaintiffs must understand both the science
and the laws in order to sufficiently assert a claim.
To bring a civil suit under federal environmental acts, there are certain
allegations plaintiffs should assert to constitute sufficient pleadings. Two
things in particular are expected even though they are difficult to obtain.
These are “the dates during which the conduct, action or inaction occurred
or should have occurred” and the “facts necessary to relate the defendant
with the conduct or inaction complained of.”133 Adding to this difficulty,
some environmental statutes require even greater detail. For example,
with respect to the Clean Air Act’s citizen suit provision, plaintiffs are
expected to “cite the specific [National Ambient Air Quality Standards,
or] NAAQS[,] pollutant at issue” and ensure the court can “determine
proper compliance with the requisite notice.”134 Many plaintiffs do not
have adequate access to these details when initially asserting their
claim.135
Despite the increasing threat that environmental harms like climate
change pose, some environmental practitioners have found pleading these
claims “onerous” under Iqbal,136 due to the difficulties in obtaining the
necessary facts to establish causation and Iqbal’s requirement for
specificity.137 Some scholars believe that trends in legal doctrines and case
law “influence [a] potential plaintiff’s incentives and decisions” on what
they should plead, or if they should sue at all.138 Few toxic torts claims are
successfully asserted due to the difficulty in satisfying the burden of proof
at the pleading stage.139 Federal regulatory causes of action have become
much more popular. This illustrates the need for plaintiffs to adjust “to the
difficulties involved in proving”140 toxic tort claims where the plaintiff
131. Id. §§ 6903, 6921.
132. Paul Tanaka, Michael Saretsky, Donna Ni, Maddy Foote & Matthew Swanson, Environmental
Law and Practice in the United States: Overview, in PRACTICAL LAW § 2 (Thomas Reuters ed. May
1, 2021).
133. Ronald B. Robie, Diane R. Smith & Summer L. Nastich, CALIFORNIA CIVIL PRACTICE
ENVIRONMENTAL LITIGATION § 6:23 (2021).
134. Id. (citing Chun v. Simpson, CIVIL 15-00102 LEK-RLP, 2015 WL 8492025 (D. Haw. Dec.
9, 2015)).
135. FUNK ET AL., supra note 79, at 10.
136. Foster, supra note 7, at 903.
137. Id.; see also Causation in Environmental Law, supra note 5, at 2261–62.
138. Juscelino F. Colares & Kosta Ristovski, Pleading Patterns and the Role of Litigation as a
Driver of Federal Climate Change Legislation, 54 JURIMETRICS 329, 358 (2014).
139. Id. at 363.
140. Id. at 343.
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“has been injured after exposure to hazardous substances or chemicals.”141
Toxic tort or contamination claims “may not become apparent until many
years after the polluting event(s) took place,” making it difficult for
plaintiffs to pinpoint exact dates or specific facts.142
Additionally, the “diffuse nature” of climate change in general and its
“widespread effects” make it hard for plaintiffs to show that emissions
from a specific facility should be lowered or that the operator of the
specific facility should be held liable for harms resulting from the
emissions without the benefit of discovery.143 Pollutants are often fungible
with many point sources, further showing the diffuse nature of
environmental harms.144 This uncertainty creates a barrier to determining
which specific source caused which specific harm.145 When a defendant
does not follow environmental statutory requirements, a plaintiff’s ability
to prove the defendant’s non-compliance is less complicated than proving
causation in toxic tort claims.146 Thus, regulatory causes of action occur
more often not only because they are simpler to assert, but because they
tend to require lower litigation costs.147 By contrast, tort claims occur less
frequently because they have high expenses for depositions, discovery,
and other related costs.148 Plaintiffs choose to select causes of action that
“can be supported with detailed facts” partially due to Twiqbal, and this
may have resulted in fewer environmental causes of action brought and
fewer rights vindicated.149
Due to these limitations, plaintiffs have fewer options for selecting a
cause of action in environmental litigation. Such particularized facts,
141. Examples
of
Toxic
Torts,
DICKMAN
L.
OFF.
P.S.C.,
https://www.dickmanlawoffice.com/personal-injury/examples-toxic-torts/ [https://perma.cc/3YG3ZKD5].
142. Pleading Standards in Environmental Cases Following the Supreme Court’s Decisions in
Twombly
and
Iqbal,
A.B.A.
(Nov.
1,
2012),
https://www.americanbar.org/groups/environment_energy_resources/publications/trends/2012_13/
november_december/pleading_standards_environmental_cases_following_supreme_courts_decisio
ns_twombly_and_iqbal/ [https://perma.cc/2238-3TV6] [hereinafter Pleading Standards in
Environmental Cases].
143. Colares & Ristovski, supra note 138, at 343.
144. Id. at 349.
145. Id.
146. Id.; see also Why Toxic Torts Are Hard to Litigate and Win, A.B.A. J. (Nov. 1, 2018, 12:15
AM),
https://www.abajournal.com/magazine/article/toxic_torts_litigate_win
[https://perma.cc/8LH9-WWT2] (describing how proving causation in toxic torts is complicated
because showing that the defendant knew a harm would occur requires discovery that can drag out
for years as well as the need for jurors that are “willing and able to consider complex scientific
evidence”).
147. Colares & Ristovski, supra note 138, at 342–43.
148. Id. at 343.
149. Id. at 363.
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which are unobtainable without discovery, make pleading a more
complicated step in filing an environmental claim. In Chubb Custom
Insurance Co. v. Space Systems/Loral, Inc.,150 the plaintiff brought suit
under CERCLA § 107(a) to recover insurance costs made to the
company’s insured from the prior property owners that were incurred on
the owner’s behalf in response to releases or threatened releases of
hazardous substances on or near the property.151 CERCLA § 107(a)(4)
requires that the insurance company have actually incurred “response
costs” in relation to the removal or remediation of the site.152 Defendant
Ford Motors argued that Chubb did not plead facts indicating that the
current owner of the property incurred response costs “or that Ford is
liable under CERCLA.”153 Although the plaintiff explained the amount of
money incurred remediating the contamination, the parties who caused
the contamination, and “generally when and how” the hazardous
substances were released, the court agreed with the defendant and
dismissed the plaintiff’s claim.154 The claim was dismissed because the
plaintiff could not pinpoint exact details.155 This case highlights the
impact of Twiqbal’s heightened requirements on environmental litigation.
IV. CONFLICT BETWEEN ENVIRONMENTAL LITIGATION
AND THE HEIGHTENED PLEADING STANDARD
Asserting environmental claims after the massive shift to the Twiqbal
pleading standard has proven onerous due to the nature of environmental
harms and information asymmetry between the plaintiff and the
defendant. Because it is no longer sufficient for a plaintiff to simply meet
the “no set of facts” standard set out in Conley, the shift to Twombly and
Iqbal resulted in “potentially dire consequences” for environmental
plaintiffs, among others.156 The impact of Twombly and Iqbal may be most
evident in toxic tort and “long-tail” environmental contamination claims

150. No. C 09-4485 JF (PVT), 2010 WL 689940 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 23, 2010).
151. Id. at *1.
152. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(4).
153. Chubb, 2010 WL 689940, at *8.
154. Id. at *10; see also Pleading Standards in Environmental Cases, supra note 142 (discussing
Chubb to illustrate how pleading has changed in environmental cases after Twiqbal).
155. Chubb, 2010 WL 689940, at *3–4.
156. Haroff, supra note 4, at 3; see also Access to Justice Denied, supra note 75 (quoting
Representative Johnson of the 111th Congress explaining that as a result of Twiqbal, “we are now
beginning to see fewer instances of wrongful conduct being addressed” and that even “one case being
thrown out due to insufficiency of pleadings . . . is justice denied”); Foster, supra note 7, at 903
(stating that “pleading climate change actions may be very onerous under Iqbal”).
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due to the slow-revealing nature of environmental harms.157 When years
pass before damages are apparent, or when the defendant possesses most
of the necessary information, the plaintiff’s ability to obtain specific
details sufficient to meet the Twiqbal standard is inhibited. A plaintiff’s
initial complaint must include sufficient factual allegations showing their
claim is plausible.158 In contrast, discovery allows the parties to obtain and
share evidence, and this provides the plaintiff an opportunity to obtain the
necessary facts to prove their claim.159 The Twiqbal standard often stops
a case before the plaintiff can use the tools of discovery because asserting
a simple Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss is
the most efficient way for a defendant to respond to an environmental
claim.160 A defendant may assert a motion to dismiss, which will be
granted by the court if there is a “failure to state a claim upon which relief
can be granted.”161 Alternatively, a defendant may assert an affirmative
defense to negate their liability.162
Further, information asymmetry as a result of environmental harms’
slow-revealing nature is very common in environmental litigation.163
Information asymmetry is when one party has information to which the
other party does not have access.164 This makes it hard for plaintiffs to
meet their burden of proof.165 In a civil suit, this could mean the defendant
in an environmental suit has access to pertinent information regarding a
contamination that the plaintiff does not have access to prior to discovery.
This asymmetry may end the plaintiff’s case before it gets to discovery or

157. Gregory M. Gotwald & Brianna J. Schroeder, Pleading Standards in Environmental Cases
Following the Supreme Court’s Decisions in Twombly and Iqbal, 44 NO. 2 A.B.A. TRENDS 16, 17
(2012). “Long-tail” harm is harm that is “attributable to continuous or repeated exposure over time”
or harm that has “a long latency period,” meaning the harm is not immediately apparent. Jennifer
Morinigo, Tom Baker & Kyle D. Logue, Allocation in Long-Tail Harm Claims Covered by
Occurrence-Based Policies, THE ALI ADVISOR (Apr. 25, 2018), https://thealiadviser.org/liabilityinsurance/allocation-in-long-tail-harm-claims-covered-by-occurrence-based-policies/
[https://perma.cc/GZT5-88XZ].
158. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009).
159. How Courts Work, supra note 15.
160. Haroff, supra note 4, at 3.
161. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).
162. Legal
Information
Institute,
Affirmative
Defense,
CORNELL
L.
SCH.,
https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/affirmative_defense [https://perma.cc/H6WU-5ZXA].
163. See FUNK ET AL., supra note 79, at 10.
164. See id. See generally J. Barkley Rosser Jr., A Nobel Prize for Asymmetric Information: The
Economic Contributions of George Akerlof, Michael Spence and Joseph Stiglitz, 15 REV. POL. ECON.
3 (2003) (discussing information asymmetry in the context of economics where one party has
information the other does not, and how changes in this information can affect outcomes).
165. See FUNK ET AL., supra note 79, at 10.
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trial.166 Twiqbal has made this issue worse. Some scholars believe the
Twiqbal pleading standard “exacerbate[s] the negative consequences that
flow from information asymmetries” that characterize environmental
cases.167
Prior to Twombly and Iqbal, the FRCP curtailed this asymmetric
information through the simplified notice pleading standard and the
process of discovery. The plausibility pleading standard set forth by
Twiqbal undermines this and places additional burdens on plaintiffs
seeking to bring environmental claims because tracing the harm to a single
actor to establish causation may not be possible without discovery.168 If a
toxic tort or contamination claim is a plaintiff’s only cause of action,
justified plaintiffs may not be able to have their rights vindicated in the
court system at all. In addition to placing additional burdens on plaintiffs,
courts have been fairly inconsistent in applying the Twiqbal standard to
affirmative defenses.169 While plaintiffs are expected to plead specific
details that may not be available without great cost before discovery,
defendants can generally assert affirmative defenses without providing the
same factual detail.170 Common affirmative defenses within
environmental litigation include res judicata, collateral estoppel,
exhaustion of administrative remedies, laches, sovereign immunity, lack
of ripeness, mootness, non-reviewable discretionary action, and statutory
conflict or exemption.171 This Part further examines the ways in which
courts have applied the heightened pleading standard.
A.

Courts that Applied the Heightened Pleading Standard to
Environmental Plaintiffs’ Pleadings

In cases where the heightened pleading standard has been applied to
environmental plaintiffs, these parties have often faced successful
FRCP 12(b)(6) motions to dismiss or roadblocks in asserting their claim
in the first place.
For example, in Midshore Riverkeeper Conservancy, Inc. v.

166. Id.
167. Id.
168. See Causation in Environmental Law, supra note 5, at 2258.
169. Although this Comment focuses on environmental litigation, courts have been inconsistent in
applying affirmative defenses in non-environmental cases as well. See Herman et al., supra note 68,
at 35.
170. See infra section IV.B.
171. Annotation, Affirmative Defenses in Actions Challenging Omission or Adequacy of
Environmental Impact Statement Under § 102(2)(c) of National Environmental Policy Act of 1969
(42 U.S.C.A. § 4332(2)(c)), 63 A.L.R. Fed. 18 § 2 (2021).
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Franzoni,172 Riverkeepers, a nonprofit organization, filed an amended
complaint against Franzoni seeking to enforce § 7002(a)(1)(B) of
Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA) and § 301 of the Clean
Water Act (CWA)173 in the District Court of Maryland.174 Franzoni then
filed a motion to dismiss, which the court granted in part.175 Franzoni
argued that the plaintiff’s allegations that the defendant’s abandoned clay
target fragments were causing “imminent and substantial endangerment
to health and the environment” and were the source of Polycyclic
Aromatic Hydrocarbons (PAHs) were insufficient because it was not in
the notice sent to the defendant.176 The court agreed and granted the
motion to dismiss in part, stating that, although the notice did contain
references to clay debris, it did not “describe abandoned clay target
fragments as an independent source of pollution, and makes no reference
to PAHs whatsoever.”177 Although Riverkeepers included specific details
about the harm endured, the court held it was not sufficient because the
plaintiff did not directly link the clay fragments to the PAHs.178 If they
had been able to conduct discovery, Riverkeepers may have been able to
obtain access to information that would have linked the clay fragments to
the PAHs.
Additionally, in OBG Technical Services, Inc. v. Northrop Grumman
Space & Mission Systems Corp.,179 environmental consulting firm OBG
brought suit in the District Court of Connecticut alleging that property
owner Northrop Grumman failed to disclose the extent of the soil and
groundwater contamination before OBG purchased the land, and that the
new owner failed to prevent pollutants from migrating to OBG’s parcels
of land.180 OBG also asserted contract-based claims alleging that Northrop
failed to indemnify OBG for migratory contaminants-related costs under
its obligations in the Purchase Agreement.181 In 2000, OBG contacted
Northrop Grumman to renegotiate the Purchase Agreement, and OBG
alleged that Northrop Grumman previously stated they were open to
renegotiating the agreement on multiple occasions.182 However, in 2005,
172.
173.
174.
175.
176.
177.
178.
179.
180.
181.
182.

429 F. Supp. 3d 67 (D. Md. 2019).
33 U.S.C. §§ 1251–1387.
Midshore Riverkeeper Conservancy, 429 F. Supp. at 71.
Id.
Id. at 72.
Id. at 75.
Id.
503 F. Supp. 2d 490 (D. Conn. 2007).
Id. at 497.
Id. at 502.
Id.
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Northrop stated that it would neither indemnify OBG nor renegotiate the
agreement.183 The court stated the facts in the complaint were not alleged
with sufficient particularity and that OBG simply recited the legal
conclusion in a conclusory manner.184 The court stated that OBG’s claim
that the defendant’s “intentional failure to disclose the true nature and
condition of [the property] was a self-concealing violation because
without the concealment . . . the violation against OBG could not have
taken place” was an insufficient factual allegation.185 The court
subsequently denied OBG’s attempt to toll the statute of limitations.186
Ultimately, the court granted Northrop’s motion to dismiss for failure to
state a claim.187 The court made this decision even though OBG did not
immediately realize the extent of the contamination due to the nature of
environmental harm.188
These cases illustrate the detrimental impact of the Twiqbal standard
on environmental plaintiffs. The application of this standard often results
in the plaintiff’s pleadings being deemed insufficient and the case being
dismissed. Plaintiffs are forced to meet the heightened pleading standard
while defendants often do not bear such a burden.
B.

Courts that Did Not Apply the Heightened Pleading Standard to
Defendants’ Affirmative Defenses in Environmental Litigation

Courts are fairly consistent in their refusal to apply the heightened
pleading standard to defendants in environmental litigation. As a result,
defendants may successfully assert conclusory affirmative defenses
without satisfactory factual support, even though affirmative defenses are
pleadings subject to the same requirements as complaints.189
For example, in Davis v. Sun Oil Co.,190 the Davises brought a federal
action against their vendor under the citizen suit provision of RCRA,
which was reviewed by the Sixth Circuit.191 The plaintiffs’ complaint
alleged that by leaving gasoline buried in the property, Sun Oil
contributed to and caused the disposal of solid or hazardous waste which

183. Id.
184. Id. at 508.
185. Id.
186. Id. at 510.
187. Id. at 497.
188. Id. at 510.
189. Brooklyn Union Gas Co. v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 478 F. Supp. 3d 417, 425 (E.D.N.Y. 2020)
(stating that affirmative defenses are pleadings subject to the same standard).
190. 148 F.3d 606 (6th Cir. 1998).
191. Id. at 608.
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may present an “imminent and substantial endangerment to health or
environment” on the property.192 Two years prior in state court, the
plaintiffs were awarded compensatory damages for breach of contract and
specific performance to clean up the site.193 The district court held that
Sun Oil’s “general invocation of ‘res judicata’ in its amended answer” was
a sufficient assertion of this defense and granted summary judgment in
their favor.194 Res judicata may be asserted as an affirmative defense to
bar “the same parties from litigating a second lawsuit on the same claim,
or any other claim arising from the same transaction or series of
transactions” that could have, but were not, raised in the initial suit.195 A
motion for summary judgment will be granted if “there is no genuine
dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a
matter of law.”196 This means the court enters a judgment for the movant
and there is no trial.197 Sixth Circuit Judge Boggs, in his partial
concurrence and partial dissent, argued that Sun Oil’s general invocation
did not suffice to overcome their “acquiescence in the maintenance by
Davis of concurrent actions in state court and federal court.”198 Judge
Boggs asserted that Sun Oil’s generally stated defense that “[p]laintiff’s
claims [were] barred by the doctrine of res judicata” was not a sufficient
one to object to the Davises’ claim-splitting under sections 24 and 26 of
the Restatement (Second) of Judgments.199
Additionally, in Ohio ex rel. Dewine v. Globe Motors, Inc.,200 plaintiffs
brought claims in the Southern District of Ohio seeking cost recovery
under § 107(a) of CERCLA from Globe Motors, Inc. and Northrop
Grumman Systems Corporation.201 The plaintiff, State of Ohio, moved to
strike a number of the defendants’ affirmative defenses and sought to
extend the Twombly and Iqbal pleading standard to affirmative
defenses.202 The plaintiffs contended the defendants had not “specified
which defenses apply to which claims,” and that the defenses asserted
192. Id.
193. Id.
194. Id. at 613 (Boggs, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
195. Res Judicata, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019).
196. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); see also Material Fact, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019)
(stating that a material fact is a “fact that is significant or essential to the issue or matter at hand; esp.,
a fact that makes a difference in the result to be reached in a given case.”).
197. Motion
for
Summary
Judgment,
LEGAL
INFO.
INST.,
https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/motion_for_summary_judgment [https://perma.cc/QPB7-TFE9].
198. Davis, 148 F.3d at 613 (Boggs, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
199. Id.
200. No. 3:18-cv-142, 2019 WL 3318354 (S.D. Ohio July 23, 2019).
201. Id. at *1.
202. Id.
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failed to meet the Twiqbal plausibility standard.203 The court declined to
apply the Twiqbal standard to affirmative defenses, stating that the
defendants do not need to “lay out the detailed basis” for such defenses.204
The district court followed the Sixth Circuit’s standard that a pleading
should only be stricken when “the pleading to be stricken has no possible
relation to the controversy.”205 “No possible relation”206 is a far less
stringent standard to meet than the “plausibility” standard laid out for
pleadings in Twiqbal.207 In this case, the court stated that because “it
cannot be said that these defenses have ‘no possible relation to the
controversy,’” it would not be appropriate to strike them.208
Further, in Suncoast Waterkeeper v. City of Gulfport,209 plaintiffs
brought a cause of action in the Middle District of Florida under the citizen
suit provisions of the Federal Water Pollution Control Act, alleging that
the defendant violated § 301(a) of CWA by: “(1) discharging pollutants
into the waters of the United States without National Pollution Discharge
Elimination System (‘NPDES’) Permit authorization and (2) violating the
terms of its NPDES Permit . . . through these discharges.”210 The
defendant asserted a series of affirmative defenses, which the plaintiff
argued should be stricken due to their conclusory nature and lack of
sufficient specific factual support.211 The court rejected the plaintiff’s
argument because “no prejudice” to the defendant had been shown by the
“allegedly insufficient pleading.”212 Further, the court stated that the
defendant could seek the factual details to support the defenses through
discovery.213 Here, the defendants were held to a less stringent standard
and had the privilege of asserting general claims without detailed factual
support as opposed to the heightened pleading standard applied to
plaintiffs. The court even recognized that the defendants would have
access to the benefit of discovery to flesh out their defenses.
Similarly, in Borough of Edgewater v. Waterside Construction,

203. Id.
204. Id. at *3 (quoting King v. Taylor, 694 F.3d 650, 657 (6th Cir. 2012)).
205. Globe Motors, 2019 WL 3318354, at *1 (quoting Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. v.
United States, 201 F.2d 819, 822 (6th Cir. 1953)).
206. Id.
207. Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 550 (2007); Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662,
666 (2009).
208. Globe Motors, 2019 WL 3318354, at *2.
209. No. 8:17-cv-35-T-24 MAP, 2017 WL 3328398 (M.D. Fla. Aug. 3, 2017).
210. Id. at *1.
211. Id. at *2.
212. Id. at *4.
213. Id.
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L.L.C.,214 Edgewater brought suit against corporate defendants, who were
associated with Waterside Construction, L.L.C., in the District Court of
New Jersey.215 Edgewater sought remediation costs under CERCLA, the
New Jersey Spill Act,216 and New Jersey common law to clean up
Veteran’s Field after plaintiffs began the Veteran’s Field Project.217
Plaintiff contended that the defendants’ affirmative defense of fraud was
insufficiently pled.218 The affirmative defense stated that the “[c]rossclaims [were] barred or subject to reduction by Alcoa’s
misrepresentations and/or fraud in the inducement of contract.”219 The
defendants contended that because they asserted fraud as an affirmative
defense, they did not need to meet the Twiqbal standard.220 Although the
court did not reach the Twiqbal issue because Alcoa did “not move[] to
strike Defendants’ affirmative defense pursuant to Rule 12(f),” and thus
allowed the affirmative defense to remain while denying the plaintiff’s
motion for partial judgment on the pleadings, the court nevertheless stated
that courts in the district “have generally found the Iqbal/Twombly
plausibility standard inapplicable to the pleading of affirmative
defenses.”221
Finally, in Dixon Lumber Co. v. Austinville Limestone Co.,222 Dixon
sought to hold Austinville Limestone Company (ALC) responsible for
environmental liabilities due to limestone tailings from a mining operation
under CERCLA in the Western District of Virginia.223 Dixon argued that
all of ALC’s affirmative defenses were conclusory and moved to strike
them.224 One of the defendant’s affirmative defenses simply stated that
“[t]he 2013 releases and threatened releases of hazardous substances at
the Site were caused solely by an act of God.”225 The court affirmed that
the plausibility standard in a plaintiff’s pleadings required more than a
“sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.”226 However, the
court did not apply this standard to ALC, stating that its affirmative
214.
215.
216.
217.
218.
219.
220.
221.
222.
223.
224.
225.
226.

No. 14-5060, 2016 WL 7256873 (D.N.J. Dec. 14, 2016).
Id. at *2.
N.J. REV. STAT §§ 58:10-23.11 to -50 (2021).
Borough of Edgewater, 2016 WL 7256873, at *1–2.
Id. at *8.
Id.
Id.
Id.
No. 7:16-cv-00130, 2017 WL 4933053 (W.D. Va. Oct. 31, 2017).
Id. at *1.
Id. at *5.
Id. at *6.
Id. at *2 (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)).
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defenses were “validly pleaded.”227 The court applied an extremely broad
and lenient standard to the defendant’s assertions, stating that “affirmative
defenses may not be pled ‘so cryptically that their possible application
will remain a mystery until unearthed in discovery.’”228
As shown by these cases, defendants are frequently successful in
asserting conclusory claims. Meanwhile, plaintiffs are left to deal with the
burden of affirmative defenses at trial if their own pleadings are deemed
sufficient. However, some courts have elected to apply the Twiqbal
standard to these defenses.
C.

Courts that Applied the Heightened Pleading Standard to
Defendants’ Affirmative Defenses in Environmental Litigation

In a few instances, courts have applied the heightened pleading
standard to defendants’ affirmative defenses in environmental litigation,
which resulted in a fairer trial.
For example, in Brooklyn Union Gas Co. v. Exxon Mobil Corp.,229 the
Eastern District of New York stated that the Second Circuit made it clear
that the Twiqbal plausibility standard applied to all pleadings, including
affirmative defenses.230 The court struck inadequate defenses that did not
meet the threshold, and allowed other defenses that met the standard.231
Applying the standard to both parties in litigation holds both the defendant
and the plaintiff to the same standard in their pleadings. While the court
in Brooklyn admitted that plaintiffs have the statute of limitations period
to gather facts and defendants have the twenty-one-day interval, the
defendants must still meet the plausibility standard and not prejudice the
plaintiff.232 The court struck defenses that were either duplicative of other
defenses, were not alleged with sufficient specificity, or on primary
jurisdiction grounds.233
Further, in United States v. Brink,234 the United States brought suit in
the Southern District of Texas to enforce the CWA against landowners
Brink and Kalter, near the La Para Creek and the Nueces River.235 The
plaintiff claimed that the landowners placed pollutants or fill material in

227.
228.
229.
230.
231.
232.
233.
234.
235.

Dixon Lumber Co., 2017 WL 4933053, at *5.
Id. (quoting Waste Mgmt. Holdings, Inc. v. Gilmore, 252 F.3d 316, 347 (4th Cir. 2001)).
478 F. Supp. 3d 417 (E.D.N.Y. 2020).
Id. at 425.
Id. at 434–35.
Id. at 425–26.
Id. at 428–29, 431.
No. C–10–243, 2011 WL 835828 (S.D. Tex. Mar. 4, 2011).
Id. at *1.
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the creek when they constructed a dam near the river.236 The defendants
raised various affirmative defenses, including waiver and estoppel.237 The
plaintiffs moved to dismiss these defenses because the defendants had not
alleged that they obtained a permit before constructing the dam by
contacting or consulting with the Corps of Engineers.238 The court stated
that affirmative defenses must also satisfy the pleading standard set out in
Twiqbal.239 The court proceeded to dismiss the defendants’ affirmative
defense of estoppel and waiver because the defendants had not “alleged
any affirmative misconduct on the part of the Government” and had not
“asserted in their answer that they contacted or communicated with the
Corps of Engineers prior to constructing a dam in La Para Creek.”240 Here,
the court did not allow the defendants to raise affirmative defenses lacking
factual support.
Brooklyn and Brink highlight how applying the Twiqbal requirements
to all pleadings, including affirmative defenses, results in a fairer trial
where both parties are on more equal footing because they are held to the
same standard.
V.

COURTS SHOULD SHIFT THEIR APPLICATION OF
TWIQBAL

Because overturning Twiqbal is unpromising, courts should apply a
uniform pleading standard to both plaintiffs and defendants alike.
Additionally, courts should allow deference for environmental plaintiffs’
pleadings. Judicial discretion remains a core function of the court system
and would allow courts to give environmental plaintiffs much needed
flexibility.241 Twiqbal’s implementation of the plausibility standard in all
civil suits turned judicial discretion into a gatekeeping mechanism that
prevents access to the courts and denies plaintiffs’ right to a fair trial,
especially for low-income litigants.242 Twiqbal impacts all litigation, but
especially environmental litigation because the particularized facts
needed to survive a motion to dismiss are often unobtainable without

236. Id.
237. Id.
238. Id. at *4.
239. Id.
240. Id. at *5.
241. Thomas O. Main, Judicial Discretion to Condition, 79 TEMP. L. REV. 1075, 1075 (2006).
242. Clermont & Yeazell, supra note 9, at 823–24.; see also Nichols, supra note 97, at 198–99
(discussing the increased financial burden on plaintiffs post-Twiqbal as a result of “expensive
prefiling investigations to meet the heightened pleading standard,” which leads to decreased access
to justice).
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discovery.243 The injustice that stems from the Twiqbal standard requires
an adequate solution that both respects the current plausibility
requirements and “ameliorates the injustice that results from dismissal of
meritorious claims when courts enforce” this pleading burden solely on
plaintiffs.244
A.

The Perfect Solution

In a more just world, the Supreme Court would overrule Twiqbal, and
the judicial system would return to simplified notice pleading. In Iqbal,
the Supreme Court completely disregarded the roles of race and religion
in the detentions after September 11, 2001.245 The Court was “indifferent
to the harm of the practices it . . . legitimized.”246 The detention of Iqbal
was deemed “rational and justified.”247 However, the identification and
classification of potential-detainees heavily relied on factors of race,
religion, and national origin, regardless of these individuals’ lack of
connection to terrorism.248 Rather than adhering to congressional intent,
the Supreme Court effectively decided what FRCP 8 meant while relying
on a foundation of racism. This foundation has resulted in injustice
throughout the judicial system. Simplified notice pleading was considered
efficient for a long time. It allowed plaintiffs to sufficiently bring their
claims to court and gain access to the tools of discovery to prove them.249
The Supreme Court shifted to a heightened pleading standard at Javaid
Iqbal’s expense, justifying racism and keeping future plaintiffs with
meritorious claims out of court and away from justice. Unfortunately, the
Supreme Court is unlikely to reverse the stringent standard it has set.250
Thus, courts should apply Twiqbal to all parties and give deference to
environmental plaintiffs due to the nature of their harms.
B.

The Twiqbal Pleading Standard Should Apply to All Parties
The Twiqbal standard may provide for a faster and less expensive

243. See Foster, supra note 7, at 903; Causation in Environmental Law, supra note 5, at 2261.
244. Zachry Sandifer, Insurmountable Burdens and Slippery Slopes: A Solution for Pleading Toxic
Torts in the Plausibility Era, 43 S. ILL. U. L.J. 435, 437 (2019).
245. Sinnar, supra note 71, at 439.
246. Id.
247. Id. at 419.
248. Id.
249. Shepley, supra note 70, at 79.
250. See Amanda Shendruk, Fewer than 2% of Supreme Court Rulings Are Ever Overturned,
QUARTZ (May 22, 2019), https://qz.com/1326096/despite-its-pending-hard-right-turn-the-supremecourt-is-unlikely-to-overturn-roe-vs-wade/ [https://perma.cc/NC5B-9L57].
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resolution of each action and proceeding provided for in FRCP 1, but it
fails to provide just resolutions, which are also called for in the same
statute.251 The current standard favors efficiency over fairness and
justice.252
Defendants can assert affirmative defenses without providing the same
factual detail that is required of plaintiffs.253 The Twiqbal standard fails to
provide a concrete framework in defining plausibility and leaves too much
discretion to judges. This often leads to unfairly biased opinions based
merely on a judge’s own convictions. As shown in Iqbal, even Supreme
Court Justices succumb to their own individual prejudices.254 The
evidence presented in that case was appraised in a highly biased manner.
Javaid Iqbal’s claim was dismissed because his unnecessarily harsh
detention was justified by the Justices based on his race, religion, and
national origin. Because Javaid Iqbal was a Muslim Pakistani man,
Mueller’s directions to detain Arab Muslim men during the FBI’s
September 11 investigation were deemed “rational and justified,” even
though the identification and classification process likely heavily relied
on those identity factors.255 This determination was often made without
any link between the plaintiff and terrorist activities.256 The Court was
indeed “oblivious” to Iqbal as a person and “blind” to race and religion
with regard to post-September 11 detentions, as well as dismissive of the
discriminatory experience of Arab Muslim men in the aftermath of
September 11.257 The racist foundation of Iqbal and its resulting injustices
must be remedied. Because it is unlikely that the Supreme Court will
overturn its ruling in Iqbal, courts must apply the standard equally to all
parties in litigation.
It is far too easy for courts to dismiss plaintiffs’ claims before they have
the chance to engage in discovery. Defendants can assert conclusory
statements as affirmative defenses with ease, but these defenses deserve
the same Twiqbal treatment the complaints receive. For example, in
Suncoast Waterkeeper, the defendants were held to a much less stringent
pleading standard than the plaintiffs and had the privilege of asserting
251. See generally Fed. R. Civ. P. 1 (stating that the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure “should be
construed, administered, and employed” by both courts and parties in a lawsuit “to secure the just,
speedy, and inexpensive determination” of every suit).
252. Jack B. Weinstein, After Fifty Years of Federal Rules of Civil Procedure: Are the Barriers to
Justice Being Raised?, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 1901, 1906 (1989).
253. See supra section IV.B.
254. See A. Benjamin Spencer, Iqbal and the Slide Toward Restrictive Procedure, 14 LEWIS &
CLARK L. REV. 185, 201 (2010).
255. Sinnar, supra note 71, at 419.
256. Id. at 420.
257. Id. at 439.
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generalized claims with no factual support.258 The court asserted the
defendant could seek the factual details needed to support their defenses
through discovery, but did not give the same deference to the plaintiffs.259
In Dixon Lumber Co., the court stated that defendants’ affirmative
defenses “may not be pled ‘so cryptically that their possible application
will remain a mystery until unearthed in discovery.’”260
These cases illustrate that defendants are consistently given the benefit
of discovery after asserting baseless defenses, while plaintiffs are left
facing unreasonably high burdens. This significant discretion in the
application of the heightened pleading standard harms plaintiffs at the aid
of defendants. While defendants can bring a motion to dismiss “without
ever filing a pleading,” or assert an affirmative defense with almost no
factual support, most plaintiffs are effectively barred from bringing suit
against their wrongdoers.261 This is especially true when discovery is
necessary to establish the highly specific facts required, like in
environmental cases.262 Twiqbal tipped the scale of justice in favor of
defendants.
However, applying the standard to defendants’ affirmative defenses
can help plaintiffs properly establish their claims by refusing to accept
defendants’ conclusory assertions. For example, in Brooklyn Union Gas
Co., the court chose to hold both the plaintiff and defendants to the same
standard of plausibility.263 This resulted in a fairer trial, where the court
adhered to the policy of not prejudicing the plaintiff.264 This trial was
fairer because both parties needed to allege their claims with the same
particularity. The defendant was unable to assert merely conclusory or
duplicative defenses that would ultimately harm the plaintiff without
cause.265
It is clear that applying the heightened standard across the board would
result in more uniform and fair adjudication across jurisdictions. If
defendants must assert their affirmative defenses with sufficient
particularity, plaintiffs may not find it necessary to bring further motions
258. Suncoast Waterkeeper v. City of Gulfport, No. 8:17–cv–35–T–24 MAP, 2017 WL 3328398,
at *4 (M.D. Fla. Aug. 3, 2017).
259. Id.
260. Dixon Lumber Co. v. Austinville Limestone Co., No. 7:16-cv-00130, 2017 WL 4933053, at
*5 (W.D. Va. Oct. 31, 2017) (quoting Waste Mgmt. Holdings, Inc. v. Gilmore, 252 F.3d 316, 347
(4th Cir. 2001)).
261. See Subrin, supra note 76, at 580.
262. Id.
263. See Brooklyn Union Gas Co. v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 478 F. Supp. 3d 417, 425–26 (E.D.N.Y.
2020).
264. Id.
265. Id. at 428–29, 431.
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against these defenses, saving both courts and plaintiffs time and money.
C.

Flexibility Should Be Given to Environmental Plaintiffs

Regardless of whether the Twiqbal standard is uniformly applied to
pleading requirements for both plaintiffs and defendants, environmental
plaintiffs should be given deference in regard to the specific factual
allegations necessary to establish a plausible cause of action.266 They
should be given this deference because of the inherent information
asymmetry in these types of cases and the diminishment of democracy.
Under the current standard, plaintiffs need detailed facts from the
beginning. This leaves the burden on them to fund premature discovery
prior to filing their complaint. This allows defendants to further take
advantage of the present asymmetry in information. Furthermore, it
hinders low-income litigants from gaining access to the courts and allows
only wealthy plaintiffs to obtain justice.267 A plaintiff’s case may easily
end before they get to discovery or trial, showing that the Twiqbal
standard has exacerbated the consequences of both the mismatch of
information and the wealth of the plaintiff. This is especially so in
environmental cases.
A plaintiff’s ability to obtain sufficient specific details at the pleading
stage is inhibited by the current standard because environmental cases are
often immersed in science and the damages are not immediately apparent.
Additionally, determining a defendant’s state of mind is nearly
impossible. This is especially apparent in contamination cases, where the
defendant may have willfully released a toxic chemical. Such
particularized facts make pleading a more complicated step because it is
difficult for plaintiffs to pinpoint exact details without discovery.268 There
is inequitable access to the scientific information needed, which raises
litigation costs for plaintiffs before the case has even begun. The
unreasonably high litigation expenses in ascertaining the necessary facts
result in expensive lawyer fees and delay a plaintiff’s case. Many litigants,
especially low-income litigants, cannot afford the expenses of high-priced
lawyers and the many billable hours required to satisfy the heightened
pleading. This diminishes access to the courts, which diminishes
266. While this Comment focuses on environmental plaintiffs, there is no question that there are
other classes of plaintiffs deserving of flexibility in pleading. Particularly in discrimination cases,
where it is hard to prove the defendants’ state of mind and only the defendants have the necessary
facts to prove a claim.
267. See Nichols, supra note 97, at 198–99.
268. See, e.g., Goliad Cnty. v. Uranium Energy Corp., No. V–08–18, 2009 WL 1586688, at *10
n.7 (S.D. Tex. June 5, 2009) (finding the plaintiff lacked sufficient specific facts under Iqbal to
plausibly show the defendant’s intention to contaminate water).
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democracy. Under the current application, environmental rights are not
protected. Pleadings are intended to provide notice to the parties, whereas
discovery is intended to give the parties the opportunities to find the
necessary facts required to establish the merit of their claims.
As long as environmental plaintiffs provide adequate notice to
defendants, courts should not require such specific facts. While we may
lose efficiency through more pleadings and trials, affording
environmental plaintiffs deference in regard to factual allegations will
allow more plaintiffs to vindicate their rights and effectively bring suit
against their wrongdoers. Obtaining efficiency at the expense of justice is
not the answer. If courts are sensitive to the nature of environmental harm,
more meritorious claims may finally see the light of day.
CONCLUSION
Applying the plausibility pleading standard to all parties and giving
environmental plaintiffs deference would be a start to rectifying the
injustice that has resulted from the Twiqbal rulings. Environmental law is
a particularly unique area of law that requires a basic understanding of the
science behind it to understand when a harm has occurred. Since the shift
to the plausibility pleading standard, environmental practitioners have
found asserting claims burdensome due to the difficulty in obtaining the
necessary and very particular facts to establish causation. Pleading has
become a gatekeeping mechanism that prevents environmental plaintiffs
from bringing their claims and receiving justice by dismissing potentially
meritorious claims and allowing defendants to make general, conclusory
assertions. The plausibility pleading requirement undermines access to
courts and fairness. It also increases the possibility of judicial bias while
by placing new burdens on plaintiffs that seek to bring environmental
claims. Applying the heightened pleading standard to defendants and
allowing environmental plaintiffs deference at the pleading stage may
address some of the inherent inequalities that have arisen as a result of
Bell Atlantic v. Twombly and Ashcroft v. Iqbal.
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